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Abstract
Annual wealth tax is back on the policy agenda, but the discussion on its
effect is not well informed. When standard methodology is used and wealth
tax burdens are measured against annual individual income, a large share of
the tax burden is found to fall on people with low incomes. The present study
uses rich Norwegian administrative data to discuss the distributional effects
of wealth tax under several different income concepts, ultimately measuring
income over the lifetime of family dynasties. When measured against lifetime
income and lifetime income in dynasties, wealth tax is mostly borne by
high-income taxpayers and is seen as clearly redistributive.
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1 Introduction
There is an ongoing debate across the world about how big the tax contribution
of the wealthy should be and whether it should be increased. Over the past few
decades, until the financial crisis, recurrent taxes on net wealth were in decline in
many countries. Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, and Sweden
had all repealed such taxes (Förster et al., 2014). Some of the few countries that still
keep a tax on net wealth are Norway, Spain and Switzerland (at the cantonal level).
More recently, though, several OECD countries have either introduced or seriously
debated introducing such taxes, as higher wealth taxes are discussed as tools to
finance public debt. For example, both Iceland and Spain recently reintroduced
wealth taxes as a temporary measure for fiscal consolidation purposes. Although
wealth tax was abolished in Spain in 2009, it was reintroduced in 2012, and is still
part of the tax schedule in 2018.1
The reintroduction of wealth taxation has been supported by important contrib-
utors in the field; see for example Piketty et al. (2013), Piketty (2014) and Atkinson
(2015), who emphasize the role of wealth tax as a distributive backstop mechanism.
However, it is acknowledged that there is little evidence as to how this type of
taxation works (Kopczuk, 2013; Brülhart et al., 2017).2
The ambition of the present paper is to contribute to a more informed discussion
on the distributional effects of this type of taxation. Our point of departure is
that the redistributive properties of wealth tax are often measured against annual
individual income, and the main message is that this practice provides inadequate
information. The contribution of the paper is to provide descriptions of how annual
wealth tax is distributed for a wide range of income concepts: annual household
income, household income over time (as observed in data), imputed lifetime income
1Similarly, Iceland reintroduced a wealth tax schedule in 2010, which lasted for four years.
2Wealth taxation is often associated with negative effects on capital accumulation and with
problematic compliance issues, as emphasized by Boadway et al. (2010) in their report for the
Mirrlees Review. The standard results that capital should not be taxed at all (Atkinson and
Stiglitz, 1976; Chamley, 1986; Judd, 1985) have recently been challenged, for example by several
contributions under “new dynamic public finance”, see Kocherlakota (2005), Albanesi and Sleet
(2006), and Golosov et al. (2013). The results of Guvenen et al. (2018) are particularly relevant,
given the present context, as they argue that, from an economic efficiency point of view, wealth
taxation should replace capital income taxation, since the tax burden shifts from productive
entrepreneurs to unproductive ones if the capital income tax were replaced with a wealth tax. It
should also be noted that there seems to be a greater awareness of negative externalities coming
from wealth accumulation and control of resources on fewer hands, which the annual wealth tax
may counteract, as emphasized by Kopczuk (2013). For example, saving behavior of the wealthy is
consistent with an interpretation of wealth as a source of utility in its own right (Carroll, 2000).
However, power and status may be seen as ad hoc motives, and taxation on such grounds may not
be easily defended (Boadway et al., 2010; Jacobs, 2013). See also discussions of wealth taxation in
a Scandinavian perspective in Bastani and Waldenström (2018) and Jakobsen et al. (2018).
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obtained by employing models of labor and capital income, and lifetime income in
the family dynasty. We show how depictions of the distributive effects of wealth tax
for different income concepts deviate from results obtained by using the conventional
annual snapshot concept of income.
We find that the Norwegian wealth tax (which is akin to a tax on financial
wealth only) has a distributional U-shape in annual income, as its burden falls
disproportionately more on taxpayers with very low income and very high income,
reflecting an unclear association between annual income and net worth. This is
also seen in several other papers; see for example Banks et al. (2003), Jäntti et al.
(2008) and Cowell et al. (2017). In such depictions wealth tax is therefore not seen
as delivering the anticipated distributional effects, and similar findings may have
contributed to the recent decline of this type of taxation in Europe.
Analysis of the distributional effects of wealth tax brings to the surface the
deficiencies of using the annual income snapshot in studies of tax burden the
distribution of tax burdens. For example, the capital owner may be positioned at
the low end of the annual income distribution due to temporary business losses (a
“bad year”). In such cases, taxation of wealth could be seen as an unacceptable
burden for the asset owner since the assets do not generate sufficient income in a
single year to enable the owner to pay an annual wealth tax on the capital (Boadway
et al., 2010). Liquidity problems are also emphasized by Bastani and Waldenström
(2018). However, this picture changes when we address household income over a
longer period of time, and ultimately use lifetime income as the income concept: the
burden of the wealth tax for low income levels diminishes and moves to the top end
of the distribution.
Furthermore, ignoring inter-generational links may be misleading in the context
of wealth tax distribution. Parents may transfer wealth to their children at an
early stage of life, suggesting that wealth taxation falls on people with temporary
low ability-to-pay, as noted by Atkinson and Harrison (1978). If we want to take
a truly long-term view of wealth and income inequality, we need to employ the
family dynasty as the unit of analysis (Becker and Tomes, 1979; Piketty, 2000;
Cowell and Van Kerm, 2015; Kanbur and Stiglitz, 2016). We find that due to the
relatively high degree of inter-generational mobility in Norway, overall inequality in
dynastic-lifetime income, when measured across generations, is lower than lifetime
income. However, the overall result is that extending lifetime income to family
dynasty income does not change the depiction of the distributional effect of wealth
tax much compared to what we see for lifetime income only.
Measures of income based on these methodological refinements are obtained by
3
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means of access to data for the whole Norwegian population aged over 19 years,
from 1993 to 2011. These data are used to establish alternative income concepts.
To measure income over time, we use information on observed income both directly
and by employing the data to establish a measure of lifetime income by estimating
models of the income generating process over the life-cycle, allowing lifetime labor
income and lifetime capital income to be explained separately. Further, to discuss
the effects of using the extended family (or the family dynasty) as the unit of
analysis, we obtain measures that are approximations of “dynastic income”, using
two frameworks: one where inheritance is added to lifetime income and another
where we aggregate income across generations.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the distribution
of the Norwegian annual wealth tax in the benchmark case – wealth tax burden
measured against distribution of annual income. Section 3 presents the empirical
framework for establishing different income concepts. In Section 4, the distributional
effects of annual wealth tax are discussed with respect to the alternative income
concepts, ultimately showing results for lifetime-dynastic income. Section 5 provides
a conclusion for the paper.
2 Limitations of annual income as a measure of well-being
Taxation of wealth is usually treated as supplementing capital income taxation; see
Boadway et al. (2010) and Keen (2015). Boadway et al. argue that in a dual income
tax system, wealth taxation may be used as an additional policy instrument to
achieve redistributive objectives. Further, as clearly illustrated by recent discussions
on reform of the Norwegian schedule (Ministry of Finance, 2015), when there is a
link between the corporate tax rate and personal capital income taxation (as in the
Norwegian system), one may find additional downward pressure on capital income
taxation.3 Moreover, if, as in the Norwegian case, there is no tax on wealth transfers
(inheritance tax was abolished in 2014), an annual wealth tax may be used to achieve
redistribution in the tax schedule, a so-called “redistributive backstop” mechanism.
Atkinson (2015), in particular, argues along these lines.
However, it may appear to fail in delivering the expected favorable distributional
effects. The distribution of Norwegian wealth tax according to the schedule of 2011
illustrates that the burden of wealth tax is not necessarily borne by high-income
individuals alone, see Figure 1. We use administrative income tax return data in
the present study, which means that Figure 1 is based on information for the whole
3Fueled by a “race to the bottom” in terms of the corporate income tax.
4
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Figure 1. Average tax as a fraction of average gross income, by quantiles of gross
income 2011
adult population.4 We see from the top diagrams in Figure 1 that the largest shares
of wealth tax are borne by individuals with high and low income, in decile 1 and
decile 10, whereas the rest of the tax burden is relatively uniformly distributed on
deciles 2 to 9. The figure illustrates that a substantial wealth tax burden falls on the
lowest income decile, when burdens are measured relative to annual gross income.5
When considering the distribution within decile 10 in more detail, as in the two
lower diagrams in Figure 1, a more favorable distributional depiction emerges. The
top permille (consisting of 3,856 individuals) actually pays less income tax as a
fraction of their gross income than the rest of the top percentile, and the wealth tax
seems to act as a backstop mechanism that ensures that the overall personal tax
schedule (income tax plus wealth tax) is progressive at the very top. We also note
that wealth tax shares in general are small, which is due to exemption and valuation
rules. Less than 4 percent of the total tax revenue from personal income and wealth
taxation came from wealth tax in 2011.
4We shall return to more information about the data in Section 3.
5To measure wealth tax and income tax burdens against gross income follows standard procedures
of Norwegian governmental reports.
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Throughout the paper we use the actual wealth tax levied on Norwegian house-
holds in 2011 (the tax exemption level has been increased since 2011 and the
statutory tax rate has been lowered). The 2011 wealth tax schedule of Norway
implies that wealth above NOK 700,000 is taxed at a rate of 1.1 percent. In 2011,
NOK 700,000 was roughly equal to €90,000 or $125,000. By international standards,
this threshold is rather low, which is also reflected in the empirical illustrations.
The general rule is that different assets are valued at market values, but there are
important exemptions: for example, the value of owner occupied housing is set at 25
percent of market value, and secondary housing at 40 percent. For most households,
the tax value of housing and total debt balances out – or at least the net value rarely
reaches the threshold limit – so that Norwegian wealth tax is in effect comparable
to a tax on financial assets only.6
There are four main reasons that the lowest annual income decile shows a high
wealth tax burden: the joint wealth of couples, life-cycle effects, transitory low
returns (or losses), and inheritance. First, while income is easily attributed to the
individual, and indeed taxed at individual level in the Norwegian system, wealth
is a variable best measured at household level. In fact, although individual filing
is the basic rule of the Norwegian personal tax schedule, taxation of wealth is
reminiscent of joint taxation, as the tax base for each spouse is the total wealth of
the couple divided by two. As a consequence, some wealth taxpayers may have low
own income (often the wife) whereas the couple’s joint income is much higher. A
natural first improvement in the assessment of the redistributive effects of wealth
tax is to rank people according to their (equivalized) household incomes rather than
their individual incomes.
Second, accumulated wealth has a different lifetime profile than gross income.
While individual income exhibits a hump shape over age, peaking at around age 50,
accumulated wealth continues to grow over most of the life cycle, declining only after
retirement. It follows that an old-age pensioner may be in a wealth tax position and
at the same time receive a relatively low pension income. This is another reason for
the wealth tax burden falling on low incomes.
Third, another group at the low end of income distribution that pays wealth
tax consists of individuals with temporarily low income due to some transitory
component, such as luck. Others are able to avoid tax by tax planning. Some of
the wealthiest people in Norway consistently report no or very low income over long
6We have experimented with different alternative formulations of the wealth tax scheme, and in
particular looked at the effects of valuing all houses at 100 percent of market value. In this case
the wealth tax becomes more evenly spread out on all deciles. However, the relative higher tax
rate in decile 1 and decile 10 remains.
6
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periods,7 and accordingly do not pay income tax, but only wealth tax.
The presence of life-cycle effects and transitory low incomes (whether due to
luck or tax planning) suggests that lifetime income is a better measure of the
capacity to pay wealth tax. In fact, one may argue that annual income is a poor
measure of ability-to-pay in general, and therefore gives a misleading picture of the
distributional effects involved in taxation, as argued by Friedman (1962), Poterba
(1989), Slemrod (1992), and Metcalf (1994).8 Since the tax base, wealth, reflects the
long run ability to accumulate savings and returns on wealth, it is reasonable that
taxation be measured against the individual’s long run income capacity.
However, wealth tax may still be regressive in lifetime capital income if some
individuals have persistently higher returns on their wealth compared to others with
the same amount of wealth, due to differences in so-called entrepreneurial spirit or
ability. Several authors have shown that persistent heterogeneity in the returns on
wealth is the key to explaining the long right-hand tail in the wealth distribution
curve; see Quadrini (2000), Benhabib et al. (2011), and Benhabib and Bisin (2018).
Fagereng et al. (2016b), using the same Norwegian register data as in this study,
show not only that returns are heterogeneous, but also that they have a persistent
component, both within and across generations.
Which brings us to the fourth and final reason; inheritance. Given that there
is strong evidence of family inter-dependencies reaching beyond the nuclear family,
a more complete picture of the distribution of resources in a society is obtained
when the dynasty is used as the unit of analysis. Thus, we employ an income
concept termed “dynastic income”. Lifetime income may be closely associated with
power or status, something that can be concentrated within families if certain
endowments are inherited across generations. In other words, we take the argument
that current income is a poor measure of well-being one step further, and argue that
individual income may hide the pivotal role of the family dynasty as an engine for
providing welfare. Several authors, such as Becker and Tomes (1979), Piketty (2000),
Mare (2011), and Kanbur and Stiglitz (2016) suggest applying a multi-generational
(dynastic) view of inequality.
7One may question how this is possible. In the Norwegian tax system, it means being paid in
terms of capital income, but having deductions, for example from losses, to reduce taxable income
down towards zero.
8Discussions of the correct definition of income dates back to the classical work of Schanz,
Hicks and Simon, the so-called Schanz-Hicks-Simon income concept. The focus is then on the
consumption possibilities obtained by income. Other authors argue that one should address
distributive justice from completely different angles, see Sen (1997) and Kaplow and Shavell (2002)
for different views.
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3 From annual individual income to lifetime-dynastic income
3.1 Introduction to income concepts employed
This section introduces the different income concepts used to discuss the distribu-
tional impact of wealth tax. Note that for comparability purposes, we use measures
of income that are defined in terms of annual income, irrespective of the time period
during which the incomes are measured. Lifetime income is for example turned into
an annual equivalent by normalizing and averaging over years.
A first extension to the individual perspective is to see how wealth taxes are
distributed on household income. We calculate household income as equivalized
income using information about spousal income, the number of children, and the
so-called EU equivalence scale.9 To simplify, we use the term “household income” in
the following, although it refers to each adult in the data set being represented by
their equivalent household income.
Next, many individuals with concurrent high levels of financial wealth and
capital losses are most likely experiencing temporary losses and would be expected
to reestablish a higher share of wealth tax to income in the longer run. There are
several studies that discuss tax policy issues by utilizing information about income
over a longer time period. For example, there are studies which use income data for
an extended range of time directly, as in Slemrod (1992), Altshuler and Schwartz
(1996), Poterba and Weisbenner (2001), Bengtsson et al. (2016), Bach et al. (2014),
Heim et al. (2014), and Fullerton and Rao (2016), whereas others utilize the data to
estimate economic models, which in turn are employed to simulate the effects of tax
policy changes. In the first group of approaches one finds estimation of dynamic
income process models, see the review in MaCurdy (2007), whereas the latter group
includes the estimation and application of dynamic structural life-cycle models, as
in Keane and Wolpin (1994).
In the following we shall use micro data to establish two types of income measures
over a longer time perspective. First, we show the results of data time series,
conditioned on observing individuals for at least 8 years. Second, we estimate and
extrapolate (or impute) lifetime income profiles, by employing the micro data to
estimate an income-generating process over the life cycle. Davies et al. (1984),
Fullerton and Rogers (1991, 1993), Cameron and Creedy (1994) are examples of
previous studies similar to this latter approach. It is well established that income
mobility has an equalizing effect on the inequality among individuals, and lifetime
income therefore exhibits less inequality than the annual snapshot; see Björklund
9Weight 1 to the first adult, weight 0.5 to other adults, and 0.3 to each child aged under 14.
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(1993) and Creedy et al. (2013).
The method for imputing lifetime income is presented in detail in Appendix A.
It can be described as taking the average and extrapolating it to each end of the
lifespan, using a deterministic age-income profile conditioned on observed and fixed
characteristics. More specifically, we estimate separate models for labor income and
capital income, using fixed characteristics of the individual as explanatory variables:
age, gender, and education. Number of children and marital status are time-varying
variables and therefore not part of the model, but will obviously affect the shape
of the age-income profile.10 Thereafter we adjust levels by adding individual fixed
effects, and finally we extrapolate the model over the entire adult lifespan. For the
capital income model we allow for differentiated estimates for quintiles of the capital
income distribution.
Finally, we extend the empirical framework to account for members of the family
dynasty. Taking account of inter-generational linkages is an appropriate empirical
strategy in studies of income inequality in general, as argued by Becker and Tomes
(1979), Piketty (2000), Mare (2011), Cowell and Van Kerm (2015), and Kanbur and
Stiglitz (2016). For example, Björklund et al. (2012) find that for Sweden, inter-
generational income transmission is remarkably strong at the top of the distribution.
See also Boserup et al. (2018) for similar evidence for Denmark. Using the family
dynasty as the unit of analysis controls for inter-generational transfer over the
lifetime: distributional effects of wealth taxation can be sensitive to the time when
parents transfer resources to the next generation, as emphasized by Atkinson and
Harrison (1978).
We approach the calculation of dynastic income, or income that takes account of
more than one generation, in two ways. The first is to add all previously received
gifts and inheritances, plus all potential inheritances, to lifetime income. Potential
inheritances are obtained using personal identifiers that enable us to link grown
children to their parents. We proceed as follows: First, we identify living parents
of the persons in our data set. Second, we estimate the overall age-wealth profile
of these parents. Finally, for mothers11 who have reached an age higher than their
cohort’s life expectancy, we use measures of parental joint wealth. For mothers
younger than their cohort’s life expectancy, we employ the age-wealth profiles to
scale down the current joint parental wealth to the expected level, depending on the
life expectancy age. In this manner we obtain measures that are approximations of
10For results on individual lifetime income, see a previous version of this paper, Halvorsen and
Thoresen (2017).
11In the case when mothers outlive fathers. If the mother is missing in data or dead, and there
is a living father, we use the father instead.
9
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expected inheritance; in particular, capturing that there are differences in parents
wealth level at high ages.
The second way of obtaining a measure of dynastic income is to sum lifetime
income across generations and calculate the cohort-adjusted average of lifetime
income in the family dynasty. Since our data set spans almost two decades, we
aggregate income over two or three generations. With this alternative, we use
information about individuals in order to follow dynastic linkages, instead of using
the household as a unit, as the latter holds more than one family lineage. We let
males who are born in the period 1933–1957 be the middle generation and add the
lifetime income of their fathers (the grandparent-generation), and the lifetime income
of their grown children. It is conventional in inter-generational mobility literature
to focus on fathers and sons because of women’s lower labor force participation.
However, in this study we allow the youngest generation (the grown children) to be
of both genders.
In the next section we describe in more detail the various income concepts used
in this study: annual household income, household income observed over time (up
to 19 years), model generated lifetime income, and two versions of lifetime-dynastic
income. First we present the data used, and next we provide descriptive statistics
on the various income concepts employed.
3.2 Data description
Data on income over the life cycle are rare. Here we use register data on income
and wealth for the whole Norwegian population for 19 consecutive years, from 1993
to 2011, see Statistics Norway (2016).12 Data are collected from annual tax records
and other administrative registers, such as the one administered by the Norwegian
Labor and Welfare Administration. Gross income is the sum of labor income, capital
income and governmental transfers. Labor income consists of wages and salaries
plus income from self-employment. Capital income consists of dividends, positive
interest, plus realized capital gains and losses. Transfers include unemployment
benefits, sickness benefits, paid parental leave, disability benefits and other social
security payments. Taxable wealth consists of deposits, money market funds, stock
12Aaberge and Mogstad (2015) use Norwegian data for the whole individual lifespan; however,
restricted to observations on labor income only, not on capital income and wealth.
10
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market funds, bonds, stocks, other financial assets13, and taxable real wealth.14 It
adds to the quality of these data that in Norway almost all incomes and financial
assets are third-party reported. Employers, banks, brokers, insurance companies
and other financial intermediaries are obliged to send, both to the individual and to
the tax authority, information on earnings, the value of assets, and other types of
information essential for the calculation of taxes. Consequently, the data set contains
precise information about various income sources, wealth and taxes paid (including
the tax paid on wealth). The data set also contains information on education, level
and type, from the National Education Registry. Importantly, given our ambition to
establish dynasties, detailed information on household family identifiers are included,
enabling us to link a person to his or her grown children and parents.
We place restrictions on the data used in the analysis. First, as we utilize income
information for each individual over several years, for example to obtain measures
of income over time, we restrict the data to persons who are observed for at least 8
years15, balancing the need to keep as many persons as possible in the data set, yet
at the same time to have a sufficiently long period for income observations. Second,
the model used to generate lifetime income is too computationally demanding to
be used on the whole population. Thus, we select a 20 percent random sample of
individuals. This sample forms the basis for establishing household income, adding
the income of the spouse to the income of the selected individual. Finally, we also
restrict the sample to individuals up to and including the age of 80. Again, this is
motivated by the lifetime income imputation, which entails assigning a fixed lifespan
to all individuals.16
13Pension rights through the National Insurance System or occupational pension schemes are
not subject to wealth taxation and therefore not reported in the tax registry. It is possible to set
aside savings in tax-exempt individual pension savings (IPS). However, the benefits from IPS are
so small that the scheme is rarely used. Only 1 percent of Norwegian households save in IPS (4
percent of households close to retirement), and the amounts invested are small. The same applies
to the cash value of life insurance, another asset category that is insignificant in the Norwegian
context. Statistics Norway is currently collecting data on pension wealth for all pension types
and for the entire population. Unfortunately, these data are not yet available, but are likely to be
published by the end of 2019.
14While housing wealth is represented by market values through hedonic value imputations,
values of holiday homes and other real assets are less accurately measured. Furthermore, the
valuation of shares in unlisted companies is a challenge that carries over to the valuations of different
portfolios in the present analysis. It would require more detailed knowledge on the companies’
balances and market position to obtain more correct values, information that we do not possess.
15In Appendix B we show results for alternative assumptions regarding the time span – 3 and 5
years. We also show results when restricting to individuals being observed over all 19 years.
16This is obviously a choice that can be questioned. A more realistic alternative would be to
assign differential mortality based on socio-demographic characteristics, like gender and education.
However, differential mortality affects the sum of lifetime income more than average lifetime income,
and the focus here is on average lifetime income.
11
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The construction of one of the concepts for dynastic income relies on information
on inheritances. We obtain all previously received gifts and inheritances from a
data set on all gifts and inheritances reported to the tax authorities in the period
1997–2011 (Statistics Norway, 2015).17 The other income concept used to measure
income in the family dynasty, the one based on aggregating income across generations,
is based on a specific sample with information on (extended) families of two or three
generations; see Appendix C for further details.
3.3 Descriptive statistics for various income concepts
Descriptive statistics for different income concepts are presented in Table 1. The
present study employs two different data sets. The upper part of the table shows
implications with respect to descriptive statistics of moving from annual individual
income to lifetime household income. In the lower part of the table, results for the
separately established data set for obtaining results for the lifetime-dynastic income
concept are compared to the annual individual income benchmark. The pattern
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for different income concepts
Gini Atkinson P90
Mean Std coeff. index /P10
Main data set
Annual individual income 447 665 .328 .212 4.04
Individual income over time 427 483 .312 .168 3.76
Annual household income 488 434 .281 .145 3.33
Household income over timea 464 385 .260 .117 3.02
Household lifetime incomeb 458 284 .205 .073 2.32
Lifetime income + inheritanceb 474 297 .209 .075 2.39
Dynasty dataset
Annual individual income 478 599 .331 .183 3.41
Individual lifetime incomeb 431 515 .304 .152 3.02
Lifetime-dynastic incomeb 428 444 .262 .110 2.72
Notes: The “Main data set” is based on a 20 percent sample of the whole population, 1993–2011,
minimum 8 years of observations. All incomes in thousand NOK based on 2011 income levels. The
“Dynasty dataset” is based on information about 160,000 dynasties, where males born between
1933–1957 are linked to their parents and their children. The Atkinson index is reported for the
inequality aversion parameter set at 1.
aBased on observed income for 8–19 years.
bBased on income generated by models for labor and capital income; see Appendix A.
17The register is an administrative register for inheritance tax filers (the tax was abolished in
2014). Gifts and inheritances from parents are difficult to distinguish from transfers from others,
as we do not have information about donors. Although smaller transfers not liable to inheritance
tax are reported because of the mandatory estate settlement, not all gifts are. Thus, gifts are likely
under-reported.
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revealed by the table is relatively clear. First, as expected, using an income concept
based on (equivalized) household income brings down income inequality, as measured
by the Gini coefficient, the Atkinson index and the P90/P10 range, compared
to inequality measured with respect to individual income. Second, employing
information over a longer period of time also decreases inequality, as shown by
the results for the income concept denoted “Household income over time”. This
income concept is average income over 8–19 years of observed income. Moreover,
the inequality is further reduced by employing an income concept based on (full)
lifetime income (“Household lifetime income”). Third, the final extension, to let
the the family dynasty be the unit of analysis, has more modest effects. Adding
inheritance to lifetime income increases income inequality, but not by much. The
average inheritance (already received or expected) is around NOK 1 million in 2011
prices. However, when distributed evenly across a lifespan of 62 years, it is reduced
to an annual amount of about NOK 16,130, which is only 3.5 percent of annual
lifetime income. In contrast, according to the results for the “Dynasty data set”,
there is a reduction in income inequality when the average income of the family
dynasty is considered, compared to the annual individual income benchmark.
4 Distribution of wealth tax
4.1 Distribution of wealth tax on household income
In this section we discuss how the depiction of the distribution of (annual) wealth
tax depends on the income concept against which the tax burdens are measured.
First, Figure 2 shows wealth tax shares by deciles for four different income concepts:
annual individual income, annual household income, household income over time
(8–19 years) and lifetime income. The figure shows a clear pattern. Moving from
individual to household income reduces the tax burden of the wealth tax in the lower
part of the income distribution, increases it in the top decile, and leaves deciles 7–9
largely unaffected. The shift from annual household income to average income over
a longer period of time (8–19 years) reduces the tax burden in decile 1 in particular.
Finally, using lifetime household income as an income concept implies that there is
a high tax concentration in the upper part of the income distribution.
In Section 2 we listed four main reasons for finding high wealth tax burdens for
low annual income: joint wealth of couples, life-cycle effects, transitory low returns
(or losses), and inheritances. In order to evaluate how the different income concepts
may potentially mitigate these measurement factors, in Table 2 we look more closely
at the characteristics of the wealth taxpayers in the lowest decile. With respect to
13
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Figure 2. Annual wealth tax as a share of income, for rankings (in deciles) by
different income concepts
the first reason, under annual individual income, the table shows that 75 percent of
the individuals paying wealth tax and belonging to the lowest decile are married
females. These are females in couples who share high joint wealth with their male
partners, but have little own income. Consequently, these taxpayers to a large extent
move out of decile 1 when income concepts based on household income are employed.
According to Table 2, there is no over-representation of old-age pensioners
(statutory retirement age is age 67 in Norway) among taxpayers when we sort by
annual individual income. Instead (not shown in the table) they are found to be
in decile 2. However, when we sort by household income, we find that old-age
pensioners account for almost half of the taxpayers in decile 1, and furthermore,
that this does not change even when household income is measured over time.
Another notable characteristic of low-income wealth taxpayers for the income
concept based on annual individual income is the relatively large share of young
people. Further inspection of the data tells us that a substantial share of this group
has inherited in preceding years. The second main explanation is that many of the
taxpayers have temporarily low income, and accordingly, when sorted by lifetime
income, there are hardly any young individuals left in the lowest decile. Since
14
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Table 2. Characteristics of wealth taxpayers in the lowest decile, ranked by different
income concepts
Annual Over time Lifetime
Individual Household Household Household
Shares
Age 20-29 0.11 0.02 0.08 0.00
Age 30-39 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.01
Age 40-49 0.15 0.07 0.06 0.08
Age 50-59 0.27 0.13 0.12 0.28
Age 60-69 0.36 0.24 0.18 0.38
Age 70-80 0.03 0.45 0.46 0.25
Losses 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05
Married female 0.75 0.11 0.11 0.11
Stock-owner 0.46 0.25 0.20 0.23
Average in NOK 1000
Annual capital income 9.2 13.5 22.6 22.8
Lifetime capital income 97.5 41.8 17.8 11.4
Lifetime earnings 395 275 229 219
Financial wealth 3,788 1,360 1,035 1,028
Housing wealth 3,352 2,256 1,988 2,164
Debt 612 270 213 183
No of taxpayers 9,104 6,630 3,166 6,238
lifetime income is almost completely age-independent, the distribution of wealth tax
closely follows the age-wealth profile.
Transitory losses and low returns is the third type of explanation. The share of
taxpayers that report capital losses or business losses is larger for low individual
income, compared to what is observed for the other income concepts. If capital
income, or more precisely the rate of return, varies among individuals with the same
level of wealth, it follows almost by construction that the wealth tax burden will be
higher on low incomes than on high incomes. By definition, if there are no labor
earnings, average wealth tax is constant across capital income as long as a) the
assets in the wealth tax base are the same as the assets that generate capital income,
and b) the rate of return is constant across individuals. Consider the average wealth
tax for individual i at age t:
awtrit =
τwWit
rtWit + Eit
, (1)
where τw is the wealth tax rate, Wit is wealth at age t, Eit is labor income earnings,
and rt is the average rate of return on investments. For the sake of argument,
15
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consider the case with no earnings, E = 0. Then the average wealth tax rate can
be seen as: awtrit = τw/rt, i.e., as long as the rate of return is the same for all
individuals, the average wealth tax rate is the same for all, irrespective of wealth
level and wealth distribution. In other words, when wealth tax is proportional to
wealth and the rate of return is homogeneous, the wealth tax rate will be constant
and equal for all. Next, if the rate of return, rt, differs across individuals, as seen in
Fagereng et al. (2016a), Fagereng et al. (2016b), and Bach et al. (2017), for example
because some individuals are more productive than others, then the average tax
rate will be low for productive owners because the denominator in (1) increases.
Alternatively, the rate of return may differ because of the asset composition, so
that owners of unproductive capital will have a higher tax burden than owners
of productive capital. Generally, the average wealth tax rate declines with the
individual rate of return, and for those with a rate of return close to zero, the
wealth tax rate becomes infinitely high.18 The regressivity of wealth tax on (realized)
capital income increases at the top end of the distribution if productive assets or
assets with high returns are undervalued in the wealth tax.
We therefore turn our attention to the top end of the distribution. Table 3
provides information about how the wealth tax burden is distributed on the top
incomes: the table provides information on the internal distribution of income and
wealth tax payments within the tenth decile, sorting incomes by decreasing fractions
of top incomes. In the table, the first column shows wealth tax in NOK, the second
column the share paying wealth tax, and the third and fourth columns report wealth
tax and income tax shares (measured against income), respectively.19
Table 3 shows that the role of wealth tax as a supplement to income tax is
seen as more advantageous in terms of lifetime income than annual income. With
reference to the discussion in Section 2, where we established that there will often
be a close correspondence between the numerator and the denominator of Equation
(1), the results in Table 3 indicate that the wealth accumulation rate is higher
than the rate of return on investments at the very top of the income distribution.
We may speculate that unrealized capital gains is the main explanation, as these
are becoming increasingly important as we move closer to the top of the income
distribution. However, it is also clear from Table 3 that the amount of tax paid and
the share paying tax at the very top is high when we sort by household income over
18As seen in Equation (1), adding earnings, Eit > 0, makes the result less clear, but if labor
income is correlated to capital income, the result still holds.
19Table 3 also shows that the results of Figure 2, with lower tax burdens at low income for over
time household income and lifetime household income, are explained by fewer people paying the
tax; see results for decile 1.
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time or lifetime income.
Table 4. Estimates of tax progressivity and redistributive effects of wealth tax
Annual Over time Lifetime
Individual Household Household Household
Pre-tax inequality (Gini) 0.328 0.281 0.260 0.205
Post-tax inequality (Gini) 0.326 0.279 0.256 0.202
Reynolds-Smolensky index 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.004
Kakwani progressivity index 0.285 0.306 0.470 0.484
Note: See Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) and Kakwani (1977) for further details about the
indexes employed.
To further illustrate the impact of using different income concepts, we present
estimates of the progressivity of wealth tax and the redistributive effects of wealth
tax for different income concepts. We employ the Reynolds-Smolensky index for
redistribution effects (Reynolds and Smolensky, 1977), defined as the difference
between the Gini coefficient of pre-tax income and the Gini coefficient of post-tax
income. In other words, we compare income inequality with and without wealth
tax. We also provide estimates for the Kakwani tax progressivity index (Kakwani,
1977), measured as the difference between the concentration coefficient of tax paid
(ranked by pre-tax income) and the Gini coefficient of pre-tax income. We find
that wealth tax is both more progressive and more tax redistributive (Reynolds-
Smolensky redistribution) with respect to lifetime income than to annual income,
see Table 4. Thus, these results indicate that employing lifetime income rankings
(instead of rankings according to annual income) results in more favorable wealth
tax distributional effects.20
4.2 Dynastic income and wealth tax
The fourth main explanation for having low annual income and still paying wealth
tax is inheritance, see Section 2. Recall that we propose two ways of accounting
for dynastic income. One is to adjust lifetime household income for inheritances,
20As the measures of imputed income are derived from rather simplistic models, it would be
interesting to see if results hold when we compare imputed lifetime income to actual (observed)
income for selected cohorts. If we narrow the income concept to labor income we have longer
income histories available. Labor income histories are observed for a maximum of 44 years in
2011, thus covering almost the entire work history of individuals who are 60-65 years old in 2011.
In Table D.1 in Appendix D we compare 44 years of labor income to imputed labor income for
cohorts born 1946-1951. Descriptive statistics for both measures of income are compared to annual
income for the same group. These results suggest that the imputation method for labor income
works well. Although this validation must be characterized as limited, we find it reassuring that
the framework is not rejected by this evidence.
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both previous and future expected transfers. The second is to take an average of
lifetime individual incomes over two or three generations. As argued above, it is
easier to follow dynastic linkages from individual to individual, because using the
household as the unit involves more than one family lineage. Therefore, we present
the redistributive effects of a shift from lifetime income to dynastic income for a
data set based on information on individuals only.
Table 5. Results for the dynastic income concept. Tax progressivity and redistribu-
tive effects
Main sample Dynasty sample
Lifetime Lifetime Lifetime Multi-
+inheritance generational
Household Household Individual Individual
Pre-tax inequality (Gini) 0.205 0.209 0.300 0.256
Post-tax inequality (Gini) 0.202 0.204 0.294 0.249
Reynolds-Smolensky 0.004 0.005 0.018 0.018
Kakwani progressivity 0.484 0.488 0.419 0.432
Note: See Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) and Kakwani (1977) for further details about the
indexes employed.
First, we consider the method whereby we add previously received and future
potential inheritances. In Table 5 the tax redistributive and tax progressivity
effects are compared to the corresponding results for household lifetime income.
Adding inheritance increases inequality, although not by much, because for most
individuals, as argued in Section 3.3, an inheritance spread out over the entire
lifespan is not large relative to annual income. However, wealth tax seems to be
somewhat more redistributive with respect to inheritance-augmented lifetime income
than to household lifetime income, indicating that inheritance disproportionately
benefits those with lifetime wealth. Tax progressivity increases very little; see Table
5.
Summing lifetime income over generations provides a different picture. In this
case, dynastic income is more equal than individual lifetime income. As mentioned
in Section 2, there is reason to expect income and wealth accumulation in dynasties
are generated by several transmission channels, including genes, family culture,
and money transfers. These factors are discussed by a large body of literature
that considers inter-generational relationships, often focusing on inter-generational
earnings correlations; see the survey in Björklund and Jäntti (2009). However, as seen
in Table 5, we find that income inequality is reduced when one moves from lifetime
income to lifetime income in the dynasty. This suggests that there is a relatively
19
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high level of inter-generational income mobility in Norway, which is also found in
other studies, see Bratsberg et al. (2007) and Nilsen et al. (2012).21 The high level
of inter-generational mobility in combination with relatively low income inequality
(Gini coefficient for annual income is 0.33, according to Table 1), means that Norway
is positioned at the (low) left-hand side of the “Great Gatsby curve”. Norway and
other Scandinavian countries exhibit a combination of low inequality and high levels
of mobility across generations.22 As with the results for inheritance-augmented
lifetime income, there is not much difference with respect to tax progressivity and
redistribution between the lifetime-dynastic income concept and lifetime income
alone. Looking at the overall tax redistributiion and tax progressivity indexes in
Table 5, we note that there is no change in the redistributive effect of going from a
lifetime income concept to a dynastic income concept.
It is not clear how one this result can be explained. The dynastic income concept
would eliminate the potential measurement error following from inter-generational
transfers of income, as it would internalize any inter-generational wealth transfers,
as discussed in Atkinson and Harrison (1978). Of course, ability (or rate of return)
may vary both within a generation (across siblings) and across generations (from
parent to child). It is not uncommon for children of very successful entrepreneurs
to be unable to obtain the same rate of return as their parents. In the latter case,
dynastic income will be lower than the parent’s lifetime income, which implies that
wealth tax may be seen as less redistributive with respect to dynastic income than
with respect to individual lifetime income. On the other hand, if there are strong
correlations in ability across generations, causing some dynasties to have an overall
higher rate of return on their wealth than other families, we would expect to see
high inequality in dynastic income. One cannot rule out the possibility that there
are privileges, for example resulting from a business monopoly, that result in strong
persistence in both income and wealth across generations.
All in all, Table 5 shows that the role of wealth tax as a distributional backstop
mechanism is somewhat more effective when viewed in a life-time dynastic perspective,
21Inter-generational links are conventionally measured by the coefficient from a linear regression
of log child lifetime income on log father lifetime income. When using this methodology on the
data available for the present study, we obtain a parameter estimate of 0.217, corresponding to a
Spearman rank correlation of 0.254. The rank correlation increases to 0.269 if we consider only
sons (not daughters). Furthermore, if we split income into labor and capital income, the inter-
generational elasticity is 0.167 for labor income and 0.415 for capital income. The corresponding
Spearman rank correlation is 0.231 for labor income and 0.285 for capital income. Rank correlation
estimates are less subject to attenuation bias in income than elasticities. However, since our lifetime
income measure is extrapolated from a selected period of the life-cycle, there may still be a problem
with life-cycle bias in the measure.
22See Corak (2013) on mobility and inequality in an international perspective.
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but that the pattern is relatively close to that seen for lifetime income (alone).
5 Summary
A comeback of wealth taxation has been supported by seminal contributors in the
field, see for example Piketty et al. (2013), Piketty (2014) and Atkinson (2015).
These calls come at a time when this type of taxation has been on the decline.
The initial conjecture here is that part of its discrediting can be explained by its
apparent inability to serve as a forceful distributive backstop mechanism. Hence,
we discuss whether this is attributable to the standard procedure of measuring the
distribution of the tax burden against annual income: Do other income concepts
produce different depictions of wealth tax distributive effects?
We find that this is indeed the case. Other income concepts generate far more
favorable distributive effects. The adverse high tax burdens at low income levels
according to annual individual income are more or less eliminated when other income
concepts are employed. Ultimately, we apply an income concept based on the lifetime
income of the family dynasty. According to this income definition, wealth tax is
clearly redistributive. Thus, if one is willing to envisage the tax burden of wealth
tax in a longer time perspective, a wealth tax is predominantly paid by the lifetime
wealthy.
Of course, there may be other reasons for not letting a wealth tax schedule be
part of the taxation of individuals. However, the argument that a wealth tax lacks
redistributive properties is not verified here. On the contrary, the evidence presented
here suggests that a wealth tax does represent a valuable redistributive supplement to
income tax. Thus, before following the example of several countries and eliminating
this type of taxation, one should consider the distributional implications of such a
move. The present study has shown how this can be done.
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Appendix A Imputation of lifetime income
In this appendix we shall explain how the measured for lifetime income is obtained.
We use two models to impute income for the individual, one for labor income and one
for capital income. Income is not normally distributed, a fact that is commonly dealt
with by log-transforming the dependent variable. However, transforming the depen-
dent variable by taking the natural logarithm complicates predictions. Moreover,
in order to calculate annual wealth tax as a fraction of lifetime income, we prefer
imputations of lifetime income for different levels. We then estimate multiplicative
models directly, using Poisson regression.23 More specifically, we regress equivalized
household labor income, Y Lit , on age and a second degree polynomial in age, both
interacted with fixed individual characteristics, such as gender and education, which
are also fully interacted with each other, so that the age profiles are as flexible as
possible,
Y Lit = exp
(
α + β′Xit + δt
2010∑
t=1993
Dt + uit
)
,
where
β′Xit = β1ait + β2a2it + β3ei + β4si + β5aitei + β6aitsi + β7a2itei + β8a2itsi + β9eisi,
and a is age, a2 is age squared, s is gender, e is a variable describing the combination
of length and field of education, {β1, β2, ..., β9} and δt are parameters, α is a constant,
and uit is the IID error term. A detailed classification of 50 educations (combinations
of length and fields), established by Kirkebøen (2010), is used, and we also control for
general income growth by including year dummies, Dt, where 2011 is the reference
year.24
Note that this life-cycle model is expressed only in observables that are assumed
fixed over the individual’s life span and that the coefficients are assumed to be
shared by all individuals. Essentially, the approach implies that gender-specific
concave income profiles are estimated for each type of education over the life-cycle.
Figure A.1 shows observed and predicted age profiles for four selected educations:
elementary school only, teacher with bachelor or master degree, engineer, and degree
in medicine. Corresponding figures for individual income can be found in Halvorsen
23The variance-covariance matrix of the estimates is obtained by the Huber/White/Sandwich
linearized estimator. This estimator of the variance-covariance matrix does not assume E(Yi) =
V ar(Yi), which is standard in Poisson regression, see Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006).
24A full set of regression results may be obtained by correspondence with the authors, as well as
the Stata code used to estimate and impute lifetime income.
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and Thoresen (2017).
Figure A.1. Observed and predicted age-income profiles for selected educations,
labor income
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We only know the person’s type of education, not their actual occupation. The
relationship between education and occupation varies, from being clear in the case
of nurses, to quite unclear for persons with a master’s degree in humanities. Thus,
although the model may provide reasonable approximations of conditional means,
as seen in Figure A.1, it may predict poorly for a given individual. Therefore,
we would like to allow for some individual variation. There may be individual
variations in level, slope and curvature of the lifetime income profile. However, since
we are interpolating incomes outside the observed ages of each person, imposing
individual-specific slopes and curvature may exaggerate patterns that are only weakly
identified over a period of a minimum of 8 years. Hence, we choose to adjust only
for differences in levels. This is done by utilizing the panel data structure and run
a fixed effect regression of income against the predicted part of the model above.
This gives us an estimate of the individual fixed effect. Calibration over the whole
life-cycle is then done by extrapolating age over the range 18 to 80, and using the
model to predict labor income,
Ŷ Lia = exp
(
α̂ + β̂′Xia
)
+ θ̂Li a ∈ [18, 80]
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where α̂ and β̂are the estimated coefficients from the model, Xia are the extrapolated
values of age, education and gender, and Ŷ Lia is the predicted value of lifetime labor
income in each period. The final step is to obtain the lifetime annual equivalent by
taking the individual average of Ŷ Lia over age.
Capital income is even more skewed than labor income, and follows a different
pattern over the life cycle. In the capital income model, different quintiles of the
capital income distribution are estimated separately, thus allowing parameters to
vary with income level. Since we observe each individual for a minimum of 8 years, we
have chosen to first identify each person’s position in the capital income distribution
by age and year in the observation period. Next, we assign the overall lifetime
position using the mode position, i.e., the position in the distribution observed most
frequently over the period of minimum 8 years and maximum 19 years.
Inspection of the data shows that equivalized household capital income, Y Kit , is
best fitted by a 5th degree polynomial in age over the life-cycle for each quintile,
q.25 Furthermore, we find differences between males and females, whereas level of
education has little predictive power. The polynomial in age is therefore allowed to
vary with gender. The capital income model can then be seen as,
Y Kqit = κ+ γZqit + λt
2010∑
t=1993
Dt + υqit for each q ∈ [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] ,
where
γZqit =
(
γ1aqit + γ2a2qit + γ3a3qit + γ4a4qit + γ5a5qit
)
si + γ6sqi,
and {γ1, γ2, ..., γ6} are parameters, κ is a constant, υqit is the IID error term and
q ∈ [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] defines the mode capital income quintile of the individual. We
control for annual variation by including year dummies, Dt. In the same way as for
labor income, we extrapolate the estimated relationship over the entire age range
and add individual fixed effects.
Table A.1 summarizes the characteristics of the resulting predictions of lifetime
income, and compares them to corresponding information based on annual income.
The averages of the two income distributions are close, which is to be expected since
individual residuals are used in obtaining lifetime income levels.
25Capital income follows closely the level of financial assets over the life-cycle. An alternative
would be to model financial assets, and subsequently derive capital income as a function of financial
assets. However, as already discussed, even though capital income is a function of the capital stock,
the rate of return is not necessarily the same for all ages and for all levels of assets – for example,
the average return depends on the composition of assets.
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Table A.1. Descriptive statistics for annual household income and lifetime house-
hold income
Gross income Labor income Capital income
Annual Lifetime Annual Lifetime Annual Lifetime
Mean 488 458 464 431 27 27
Std 434 299 321 171 268 221
Gini coefficient .281 .205 .321 .184 .888 .771
Atkinson index .145 .073 .236 .057 .919 .717
P90/P10 3.33 2.32 4.13 2.24 322.7 31.32
Notes: Based on information on approximately 600,000 individuals, maximum 80 years old.
observed for 8 years. All incomes are in thousands of 2011 NOK. The Atkinson index is reported
for the inequality aversion parameter (ε) set at 1.
Appendix B Different time spans
This appendix discusses the implication of different time spans for the calculation
of income over time. First, Table B.1, presents estimates of inequality for different
assumptions regarding the time span for which we aggregate income when we
calculate average income over time. We see that the measured income inequality
decreases as the number of years increases. Further, Figure B.1 illustrates that
even when we observe incomes over a long period, such as 19 years, we only have
information about a fraction of the lifespan. The income profile remains clearly hump-
shaped and the lifetime income of the young and the old would be underestimated
compared relative to the middle-aged.
Table B.1. Characteristics of household income over time with varying observation
time spans
Household equivalized average income over
Annual 3 years 5 years min 8 year 19 years
Mean 488 480 472 464 506
Std 434 374 368 385 413
Gini coefficient .281 .269 .267 .260 .239
Atkinson index .145 .131 .125 .117 .097
P90/P10 3.33 3.21 3.18 3.02 2.64
No. of obs 600,276 600,276 600,276 600,276 452,524
Notes: All incomes in thousands of 2011 NOK. Income over time is adjusted using the income
growth in the sample to obtain income levels that are comparable to the annual income level in
2011. The Atkinson index is reported for the inequality aversion parameter (ε) set at 1.
31
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
A
cc
ep
te
d
 A
rt
ic
le
Figure B.1. Age profiles of averages based on different time spans
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Appendix C Description of the linked-generations data set
We are able to establish a lifetime-dynastic data set by exploiting information on
individuals from the Norwegian population register. The population register contains
information on all Norwegians holding a Norwegian personal identification number,
and is used here to link a person to his parents and grown children. There are
several inter-generational lines within the dynasty, depending on which persons are
linked. To obtain a manageable empirical framework, the strategy here is based on
letting males born between 1933 and 1957 take the role as the “head of the dynasty”.
These males are then linked to their fathers, their children, or both. Only dynasties
with relatively simple descendance lines were selected, which is achieved by requiring
that the head of the dynasty and his father have registered children with only one
partner. As in the preceding part of the analysis, each individual is required to be
observed for a minimum of 8 of the 19 years for which we have observations. When
we further restrict the data set to dynasties where the dynasty head was observed
in 2011, we end up with observations of approximately 160,000 dynasties.
Table C.1 shows descriptive statistics for the dynasty data set and how it compares
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Table C.1. Descriptive statistics for different data sets
Full dynasty sample Dynasty head Main sample
Gross income 514 478 447
Labor income 482 440 425
Capital income 32 38 22
Age 55 67 50
Male .78 1 .50
Wealth tax 5.8 7.2 4.1
Financial wealth 724 856 754
No. of observations 403,196 156,735 600,276
Notes: Measured in thousands of NOK in 2011. Results referred to under “Main sample” are for
individual income (in one year). “Full dynasty sample” is the sample before various restrictions.
to the previously used main sample, i.e., reflecting the implications of restricting
the data set to a sample based on the “heads” of dynasties. The individuals in the
dynasty data differ from the representative population sample by being on average
older, wealthier and consisting predominantly of males.26 This follows from the way
the data set is constructed, focusing on male dynasty heads born between 1933 and
1957.
The lifetime income of members of the dynasty is obtained by means of the
same estimated coefficients derived by imputing labor income and capital income as
described in Appendix B, but on individual income rather than household income.
There are birth cohort differences in the level of lifetime income. As income of a
dynasty is simply the average lifetime incomes of the members of the dynasty, and
as the members belong to different generations, we first normalize lifetime incomes
to comparable levels, irrespective of birth cohort. We obtain the cohort-specific
levels by regressing lifetime income, ˆY LTi , on dummies for cohort, Dci , as
ˆY LTi = exp (η + δcDci + νi) ,
where δc and η are parameters and νi is the error term. The 1948-52 birth cohort
is used as reference level. Lifetime incomes are then adjusted according to the
percentage deviation from the reference cohort, and finally we obtain estimates
of dynasty income, Ŷ D, based on the average lifetime income of members of the
dynasty:
Ŷ D = 1
M
M∑
m=1
(
(1− δc) ˆY LTm
)
,
where M is the number of dynasty members (either two or three). Table C.2 shows
26The “Full dynasty sample” is the sample before restricting to gender, year of birth and
inter-generational links.
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how the dynasty income distribution compares to the distributions of annual income
and lifetime income, in terms of descriptive measures.
Table C.2. Descriptive statistics for annual, lifetime and dynastic income. Dynasty
head sample
Annual income Lifetime income Dynastic income
Mean 478 431 428
Std 599 515 444
Gini coefficient .33 .30 .26
Atkinson index (ε = 1) .18 .15 .11
P90/P10 3.4 3.0 2.7
Notes: Based on information on 156,735 individuals. Annual income in thousands of NOK in 2011,
and average lifetime income in thousands of 2011 NOK.
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Appendix D Alternative individual lifetime labor income
Table D.1. Distribution of wealth tax by annual labor income, 44-year average
labor income, and lifetime labor income
Annual labor income Wealth tax Fraction Wealth Income
in NOK paying tax rate tax rate
0–p10 4,282 0.26 0.031 0.107
p10–p50 2,753 0.28 0.010 0.171
p50–p90 4,741 0.35 0.011 0.267
p90–p95 12,052 0.44 0.017 0.322
p95–p99 24,091 0.51 0.025 0.384
p99–p99.9 97,341 0.54 0.064 0.448
p99.9–p100 251,362 0.91 0.065 0.348
44-year history Wealth tax Fraction Wealth Income
in NOK paying tax rate tax rate
0–p10 2,443 0.23 0.016 0.176
p10–p50 2,352 0.28 0.007 0.200
p50–p90 4,142 0.34 0.008 0.230
p90–p95 13,382 0.49 0.020 0.337
p95–p99 29,049 0.56 0.037 0.366
p99–p99.9 86,790 0.70 0.080 0.470
p99.9–p100 578,365 0.92 0.196 0.368
Lifetime labor income Wealth tax Fraction Wealth Income
in NOK paying tax rate tax rate
0–p10 1,102 0.21 0.006 0.092
p10–p50 1,591 0.25 0.005 0.174
p50–p90 3,611 0.36 0.008 0.246
p90–p95 8,105 0.52 0.012 0.334
p95–p99 26,283 0.65 0.032 0.409
p99–p99.9 94,612 0.73 0.081 0.398
p99.9–p100 624,162 0.92 0.165 0.242
Notes: Restricted data set, household heads 60–65 years old in 2011. The number of observations
is 12,110 individuals. Average calculated on wage-deflated incomes.
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Table D.2. Descriptive statistics for annual, lifetime and dynastic income. Dynasty
head sample
Gini Atkinson P90
Mean Std coeff. index /P10
Annual labor income (2011) 393 253 0.28 0.13 3.2
44-year history of labor income 412 186 0.24 0.13 3.3
Imputed lifetime labor income 414 242 0.22 0.09 2.6
Notes: Restricted data set, individuals 60-65 years old in 2011. The number of observations is
12,110 individuals. Average calculated on wage-deflated incomes.
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